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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) dictionary
and the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) feeds. These reposito-
ries are widely used in Vulnerability Management Systems (VMSs) to check for
known vulnerabilities in software products. The analysis shows, among other
issues, a lack of synchronization between both datasets that can lead to in-
correct results output by VMSs relying on those datasets. To deal with these
problems, we developed a method that recommends to a user a prioritized list
of CPE identifiers for a given software product. The user can then assign (and,
if necessary, adapt) the most suitable CPE identifier to the software so that
regular (e.g., daily) checks can find known vulnerabilities for this software in
the CVE feeds. Our evaluation of this method shows that this interaction is
indeed necessary because a fully automated CPE assignment is prone to errors
due to the CPE and CVE shortcomings. We implemented an open-source VMS
that employs the proposed method and published it on GitHub.
Keywords: elsarticle.cls, LATEX, Elsevier, template
1. Introduction
Cybercriminals often infect their victims by exploiting vulnerabilities in soft-
ware products. For example, a cybercriminal can persuade a user to open a
malicious PDF document using social engineering techniques like spear phish-
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ing. If the user employs a vulnerable version of a PDF reader, malicious code
embedded in the document exploits the vulnerability, resulting in the user being
infected with malware (e.g., Ransomware).
Vulnerabilities on software products seem to be a never-ending problem.
In 2015, 5,585 new vulnerabilities were found [1]. Similarly, in 2016, more
than 6,000 software flaws were published in the National Vulnerability Database
(NVD)1. The number of undisclosed or zero-day vulnerabilities has increased
over the last years [1]. Nonetheless, publicly known vulnerabilities still are the
highest risk for organizations. As reported by the SANS institute, in more than
80% of the security incidents known flaws were exploited [2]. The most exploited
vulnerabilities in 2015 were vulnerabilities published in 2011 and 2007 [3].
To avoid data breaches caused by software vulnerabilities, organizations de-
ploy Vulnerability Management Systems (VMSs) inside their IT infrastructures.
Among the main functionalities, a VMS scans for software products installed
inside a company that has potential vulnerabilities. To perform this task, the
system manages an inventory containing information of the installed products,
and moreover, it correlates this information with vulnerability information ob-
tained from private (e.g., software vendors) and public sources, such as Com-
puter Emergency Response Teams (CERTs), the NVD or Bugtraq2.
Within the most used sources of vulnerability information are the Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) feeds3, which are a subset of the NVD
and offered by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
The CVE feeds contain identifiers for known vulnerabilities (e.g., CVE-2015-
1538) and information related to them. To identify software products affected
by a vulnerability, a CVE includes a list of vulnerable software, in which the
description of a product follows the specifications of the Common Platform
Enumeration (CPE) standard4.
1https://nvd.nist.gov
2http://bugtraq-team.com
3https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/data-feeds
4https://cpe.mitre.org
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The use of standards like CVE and CPE helps IT security vendors, security
experts, research institutes, etc. to publish and exchange information efficiently
and effectively. Additionally, the standards are employed by VMSs to assign
structured identifiers to software products (inventory) and search for vulnera-
bilities related to them (vulnerability scanning). In this paper, we present an
analysis of the official CPE dictionary and CVE feeds that show inconsistencies
in these datasets that could prevent VMSs from delivering reliable results when
scanning for vulnerabilities.
The paper is structured as follows. We first introduce the CPE and CVE
standards and their role in VMSs (Section 2). Then, we provide an analysis
of the CPE dictionary and CVE feeds (Section 3). In Section 4, we describe a
method that aims at dealing with the issues found in the CPE dictionary and
CVE feeds. Section 5 contains an evaluation of our method. Section 6 describes
related work. Finally, Section 7 gives a conclusion.
2. Background
This section briefly describes the standards that are used in our method
to scan for vulnerabilities: Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) and Com-
mon Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE). In addition, we explain the relation
between both standards and how they are employed by VMSs.
2.1. Common Platform Enumeration (CPE)
CPE is a method that specifies a naming scheme for applications, hardware
devices, and operating systems. CPE is part of the Security Content Automa-
tion Protocol (SCAP)5 standard, which was proposed by the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST). Currently, there exist two versions of the
CPE specification: CPE 2.2 and CPE 2.3. Version 2.3 defines a stack formed
by five specifications, including the CPE naming specification [4] and the CPE
dictionary specification [5].
5https://scap.nist.gov
3
The CPE naming scheme is defined by a set of attributes called Well-Formed
CPE Name (WFN ). The following attributes are part of this format: part, ven-
dor, product, version, update, edition, language, sw edition, target sw, target hw,
and other. Listing 1 shows the WFN format for the software product Microsoft
Internet Explorer 8. The value of the attribute part indicates that the IT asset
is an application. The logical value NA means not applicable or not used. NA is
assigned to attributes that have no meaning for a software product. The logical
value ANY indicates that there are no restrictions for an attribute.
Listing 1: Possible WFN format for Microsoft Internet Explorer 8
part : a , vendor : mic roso f t , product : i n t e r n e t e x p l o r e r , version : 8 ,
update :NA, edition :ANY, language :ANY, sw edition :ANY,
target sw :ANY, target hw :ANY, other :ANY
The CPE specification is used to assign identifiers to assets inside an IT infras-
tructure. Currently, CPE supports two formats: URI (defined in CPE version
2.2) and formatted string (defined in CPE version 2.3). A URI or formatted
string identifier is generated from the WFN of an IT asset. This process is called
URI or formatted string binding. Listing 2 and Listing 3 show examples for the
URI binding and formatted string binding respectively.
Listing 2: WFN of Listing 1 bound to a URI
cpe : / a : m i c ro so f t : i n t e r n e t e x p l o r e r :8:−
Listing 3: WFN of Listing 1 bound to a formatted string
cpe : 2 . 3 : a : m i c ro so f t : i n t e r n e t e x p l o r e r : 8 : − : ∗ : ∗ : ∗ : ∗ : ∗ : ∗
Besides the naming specification, the CPE 2.3 stack encompasses the CPE dic-
tionary specification, which defines the structure (e.g., names and metadata) of
a repository containing CPE identifiers for classes of IT products. Each entry
in the dictionary contains the bound form (URI and/or formatted string) of a
product’s WFN. The National Vulnerability Database (NVD) hosts and main-
tains the official CPE dictionary6, which is provided in XML format. Figure 1
6https://nvd.nist.gov/products/cpe
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<cpe-item name=" "> cpe:/a:mozilla:firefox:38.0
    <title xml:lang=" ">Mozilla Firefox 38.0</title> en-US
    <references> 
        <reference href=" ">Version</reference> https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/releases/
    </references> 
    <cpe-23:cpe23-item name=" "/> cpe:2.3:a:mozilla:firefox:38.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
</cpe-item> 
Figure 1: CPE entry for Mozilla Firefox 38.0 in the official CPE dictionary
shows a CPE entry of the official dictionary version 2.3. The entry contains the
URI (for backward compatibility with CPE version 2.2) and formatted string
that identify the application Mozilla Firefox 38.0.
2.2. Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
CVE, which is also part of the SCAP specifications, is a method used to
assign identifiers to publicly known vulnerabilities found in IT products and to
provide information (e.g., affected products) about the vulnerabilities. Across
organizations, anti-virus vendors, and security experts, CVE has become the
de facto standard to share information on known vulnerabilities and exposures.
Assignment of unique identifiers to vulnerabilities is managed by the MITRE
Corporation7, and the NVD provides documents in XML format (CVE feeds8)
that contain the CVE identifiers defined by MITRE along with additional in-
formation (e.g., severity, vulnerable configuration, and a list of vulnerable soft-
ware). Figure 2 shows a CVE entry obtained from the CVE feed for 2016. Note
that some information has been omitted to save space.
2.3. CVE and CPE in a Vulnerability Management System (VMS)
One of the goals of a VMS is the detection of vulnerable IT assets (e.g.,
vulnerable software products) in an IT infrastructure. A VMS also includes
other aspects like risk management and remediation. In this paper, we focus
on the vulnerability detection capabilities of a VMS. In this context, the CPE
dictionary and CVE feeds play an important role. VMSs employing CPE and
7https://cve.mitre.org
8https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/data-feeds
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<entry id="CVE-2016-0006"> 
    <vuln:vulnerable-configuration id="http://nvd.nist.gov/"> 
        <cpe-lang:logical-test operator="OR" negate="false"> 
            <cpe-lang:fact-ref name="cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_10:1511::~~~~x86~"/> 
            <cpe-lang:fact-ref name="cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_10:1511::~~~~x64~"/> 
            <cpe-lang:fact-ref name="cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_10:-:gold:~~~~x86~"/> 
 
        </cpe-lang:logical-test> 
    </vuln:vulnerable-configuration> 
    <vuln:vulnerable-software-list> 
        <vuln:product>cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_vista:-:sp2</vuln:product> 
        <vuln:product>cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_server_2008:r2:sp1</vuln:product>  
        <vuln:product>cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_10:1511::~~~~x86~</vuln:product> 
         
    </vuln:vulnerable-software-list> 
    <vuln:cve-id>CVE-2016-0006</vuln:cve-id> 
    <vuln:published-datetime>2016-01-13T00:59:04.590-05:00</vuln:published-datetime> 
    <vuln:last-modified-datetime>2016-12-07T13:30:05.377-05:00</vuln:last-modified-datetime> 
    <vuln:cvss> 
        <cvss:base_metrics> 
            <cvss:score>6.9</cvss:score> 
            <cvss:access-vector>LOCAL</cvss:access-vector> 
            <cvss:access-complexity>MEDIUM</cvss:access-complexity> 
 
        </cvss:base_metrics> 
    </vuln:cvss> 
    <vuln:cwe id="CWE-264"/> 
    <vuln:references xml:lang="en" reference_type="VENDOR_ADVISORY"> 
        <vuln:source>MS</vuln:source> 
        <vuln:reference href="http://technet.microsoft.com/…" xml:lang="en">MS16-008</vuln:reference> 
    <vuln:summary>The sandbox implementation in Microsoft Windows Vista SP2, Windows …</vuln:summary> 
</entry> 
Figure 2: Entry of the CVE feed for 2016. The identifier of this vulnerability is CVE-2016-0006
CVE depend on the compatibility between both datasets. The CPE dictionary
is queried by a VMS to find CPE identifiers that match IT products in the
infrastructure where the VMS operates. Since the CVE entries of the CVE
feeds contain a list of vulnerable software in CPE format (see Figure 2), it
allows the VMS to find related vulnerabilities for the IT products using their
assigned CPE identifier.
3. CPE Dictionary and CVE Feeds Analysis
This section discusses issues that we found in the official CPE dictionary9
and CVE feeds10 that can lead to incorrect results of VMSs relying on those
9https://nvd.nist.gov/cpe.cfm
10https://nvd.nist.gov/download.cfm
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repositories to find vulnerabilities in software products.
3.1. CVE entries without CPE entries
The CVE feeds (as of February 14th, 2017) contain 895 CVE entries that
do not have any CPE identifier. For example, CVE-2016-9748 is a vulnerability
for the products IBM Rational DOORS Next Generation 5.0 and 6.0. This
CVE has no CPE identifier, even though the official CPE dictionary has CPE
identifiers for these products, as shown in Listing 4.
Why this is a problem. VMSs that only use CPE identifiers to find related
CVE entries for software products deliver incomplete results. For example, if
a vulnerability is found and a CVE entry is created for it without CPE iden-
tifiers, a VMS would not generate any alert for the IT assets affected by that
vulnerability.
Listing 4: CPE identifiers found in the official CPE dictionary (accessed on February 14th,
2017) for IBM Rational DOORS Next Generation versions 5.0 and 6.0.0
cpe : / a : ibm : r a t i o n a l d o o r s n e x t g e n e r a t i o n : 5 . 0 .
cpe : / a : ibm : r a t i o n a l d o o r s n e x t g e n e r a t i o n : 6 . 0 . 0
3.2. Software Products without assigned CPE
There are software products for which no CPE entry has been created in
the official CPE dictionary. For example, the product Microsoft Search Server
does not have an entry in the dictionary. Nonetheless, according to CVE-2008-
403211, version 2008 of this product is vulnerable, and the CVE entry contains
two CPE identifiers for it.
Why this is a problem. Full automation (i.e., without human interaction) of
the process of assigning a CPE identifier to a software product can lead to false
positives or false negatives. Since there are software products for which no
CPE identifier exists in the CPE dictionary, a fully automated system trying to
11https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2008-4032
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assign an existing CPE to a software product would either assign an incorrect
best match or not assign a CPE at all. Consequently, either incorrect CVE
entries are found for these software products (false positives), or the actual
CVE entries related to those products are not found (false negative).
3.3. CPE Dictionary Deprecation Process
According to the CPE dictionary specification version 2.3 [5], CPE identifiers
are deprecated for three reasons: identifier name correction, identifier name
removal, or additional information discovery. Up to February 14th, 2017, the
CPE dictionary contained 2,614 deprecated entries; all of them are due to name
correction. Listing 5 shows one of the deprecated identifiers found in the official
CPE dictionary. In this case, the deprecation was caused by a typo in the word
player.
Why this is a problem. If a VMS assigns a CPE identifier to a software product
that is later corrected, then CVEs containing the corrected CPE could not be
found. Following the example shown in Listing 5, if a system tries to obtain
CVE entries that fulfill the condition: vendor equals adobe and name equals
flash playe for linux, it is likely that the query does not return any results,
since the typo is probably present only in the CPE dictionary and not in the
CVE feeds.
Listing 5: Deprecated identifier in the official CPE dictionary
cpe : / a : adobe : f l a s h playe f o r l i n u x : 9 . 0 . 1 1 5 . 0 (deprecated)
cpe : / a : adobe : f l a s h player f o r l i n u x : 9 . 0 . 1 1 5 . 0 (corrected)
3.4. NVD Synchronization
The CVE feeds (as of February 14th, 2017) contain 105,591 CPE entries that
do not exist in the CPE dictionary. The analysis showed that this problem is
caused by several reasons. One of them was already pointed out in Section 3.2:
in the official CPE dictionary, there are vulnerable IT products without CPEs.
In addition, there are CPEs which are semantically equal, but nonetheless, their
8
Figure 3: Method overview
WFNs’ attributes contain different values, resulting in different CPEs. Listing 6
shows an example of this case. The CPE found in the CPE dictionary uses the
update attribute. On the other hand, the CPE of the CVE feeds concatenates
the update (beta1) with the version (1.4.0 beta1). This clearly demonstrates
that synchronization between the official CPE dictionary and the CVE feeds do
not take place, though both datasets are hosted in the NVD which is managed
by the NIST.
Listing 6: CPEs semantically equal but with different WFN attributes. The first CPE is
found in the official CPE dictionary and the second one in the CVE feeds.
cpe : / a : digium : a s t e r i s k : 1 . 4 . 0 :beta1
cpe : / a : digium : a s t e r i s k : 1 . 4 . 0 beta1
Why this is a problem. If a VMS assigns a CPE to a software product using
the entries of the CPE dictionary only, there is a risk that no CVE is found for
that product.
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4. Method
The method described in this paper comprises three steps: CPE matching,
CPE assigment, and CVE matching. An overview is shown in Figure 3.
In the first step, CPE identifiers that could be assigned to a software product
(CPE candidates) are searched for. The search is based on the product’s vendor,
name, and version strings (e.g., Microsoft Internet Explorer 8) that is stored in
an inventory database. As shown in Section 3, automatically assigning CPEs
to software products is problematic. The evaluation in Section 5 supports this
finding. Therefore, in the second step, human interaction is required to assign
the most suitable CPE to a product. In the third step, CVEs are looked up for
a software product based on its assigned CPE. The CPE and CVE matching
is carried out using the CPE WFN format. Hence, the URIs of the CPEs are
first unbound to WFNs. The described method is the core of an open-source
VMS that we will present in Section 5. In the following sections, the conversion
of a URI to a WFN is shortly described, and thereafter, the CPE and CVE
matching algorithms are explained.
4.1. Well-Formed Name (WFN) Conversion
Before carrying out the steps shown in Figure 3, the URIs (CPE identifiers) of
both CPE dictionary and CVE feeds are converted into their WFN format. The
conversion is based on the CPE Naming Specification Version 2.3 [4]. Listing 7
shows the conversion of a URI binding into its WFN format.
Listing 7: URI to WFN conversion example
CPE URI
cpe : / a : m i c ro so f t : i n t e r n e t e x p l o r e r : 8 . ∗ : : en˜−˜˜windows˜x86˜
CPE WFN
part : a , vendor : mic roso f t , product : i n t e r n e t e x p l o r e r ,
version : 8 .∗ , update : ANY, language : en , edition : NA,
sw edition : ANY, target sw : windows , target hw : x86 , other : ANY
The idea of this conversion is to compare two CPEs based on their WFN at-
tributes (e.g., vendor) and not using their URIs. This allows to determine
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which attributes are unequal so that weights can be assigned to the attributes
according to their importance. For instance, the attributes vendor, product, and
version have higher weights than the attributes target sw, target hw, or other.
In addition, the WFN format allows to perform logical comparisons between
two CPEs’ versions. For example, the version 8.* is equal to 8.2.7, due to the
special character *.
As explained in Section 3, the CPE dictionary can contain incorrect CPE
identifiers (e.g., Listing 5 shows a URI binding with a typo in the word player).
This can prevent from finding potential CVE matches for a software product.
This can however be overcome with string similarity algorithms such as Leven-
shtein edit distance [6]. Nonetheless, if we apply this algorithm for the whole
URI string, we cannot establish which attributes (e.g., vendor, product, version)
of the CPEs being compared are not equal.
4.2. CPE Matching
The CPE matching algorithm aids the correct assignment of a CPE to a
software product by suggesting CPE candidates found in the CPE dictionary.
As depicted in Figure 4, the algorithm receives as input the product’s informa-
tion obtained from an IT assets database (e.g., GLPI12). Then, three steps are
performed: Generate Search Terms, Search by Product and Vendor, and Sort by
Version.
Step 1: Generate Search Terms. In this step, using the information pro-
vided by the inventory database, search terms to query the CPE dictionary are
generated. Listing 8 shows the information obtained from a GLPI database for a
Microsoft product. Two groups of search terms are generated: vendor and prod-
uct search terms. The former are generated with the value of the field “product”,
and the latter with the value of the field “vendor”. For both groups the follow-
ing operations are performed: First, the value is split by spaces and converted
12http://glpi-project.org
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to lower case. For example, from the string “Microsoft .NET Framework 4.5.2”,
the following terms are generated: microsoft, .net, framework, and 4.5.2. If more
than one term is generated, joined terms are formed by concatenating terms with
an underscore between them (e.g., microsoft .net framework). Underscores are
used in the CPE dictionary to replace spaces. If a vendor term (e.g., microsoft)
is present in the product search terms, the joined terms of the product are
duplicated but removing the vendor term (e.g., .net framework). During the
analysis of the CPE dictionary, we observed that some CPE identifiers include
the vendor in the product attribute (e.g., cpe:/a:adobe:adobe air:1.0) while
other CPE identifiers exclude it (e.g., cpe:/a:adobe:air:15.0.0.293). Therefore,
product search terms with and without the vendor are generated. Listing 9
shows the search terms generated with the information of Listing 8.
The additional search terms increase the search cost but improve the ac-
curacy of the CPE matching algorithm. For instance, to find CPEs similar to
.net framework 4.5.2, the algorithm should also consider CPEs with a difference
of at least six characters ( 4.5.2 ) in the attribute product of their WFNs. Doing
this would generate inaccurate results, e.g., the string player would match the
string joomla, if the threshold of the edit distance is set to six.
Listing 8: Software product obtained from a GLPI database
vendor : Mic ro so f t Corporat ion
product : Mic ro so f t .NET Framework 4 . 5 . 2
version : 4 . 5 . 51209
Listing 9: Search terms generated with the information shown in Listing 8
vendor terms : [ m i c r o s o f t c o r p o r a t i o n , microso f t , co rpo ra t i on ]
product terms : [ m i c r o s o f t . net framework 4 . 5 . 2 ,
m i c r o s o f t . net framework , m i c r o s o f t . net , microso f t ,
. net framework 4 . 5 . 2 , . net framework , framework , . net , 4 . 5 . 2 ]
Step 2: Search by Product and Vendor. Using the generated search terms,
CPEs for a software product are searched for in the CPE dictionary by com-
paring the search terms with the CPE WFN attributes vendor and product. To
12
consider a CPE as match, the following condition must be met:
(cpe.wfn.vendor ' vendor search term) AND
(cpe.wfn.product ' product search term)
Note that the symbol similar or equal (') and not the symbol equal (=) is
employed. As discussed in Section 3, the CPEs can contain typographical er-
rors; therefore, to determine the similarity between a search term and the WFN
attribute, the Levenshtein distance algorithm [6] is used. When the Leven-
shtein distance is less or equal to two, the CPE is considered a match (it can be
discarded in the next steps). To establish this threshold, we analyzed the dep-
recated CPEs in the CPE dictionary. We observed that the CPEs deprecated
due to a typo in the attribute product have a Levenshtein distance of one or
two.
Step 3: Order by Version. Finally, the CPEs found in the previous step are
ordered by version. CPEs with similar or equal versions as the software product
version are prioritized. Two versioning schemes are considered: versions defined
by years (e.g., 2008) and dotted versions like 1.2.49. The latter are split by the
dots.
4.3. CVE Matching
In this section we describe how the CVE matching algorithm searches for
CVEs related to a software product. The algorithm performs three steps: Search
by CVE-CPE Entries, Search by CVE Summary, and Merge CVE Candidates.
Step 1: Search by CVE-CPE Entries. As explained in Section 2, each
entry in the CVE feeds contains a list of software products that are affected
by the CVE. The list is written in the form of CPE URIs, which facilitates
finding CVEs for a software product using its assigned CPE. To determine
whether a CVE is a match for a software product, the product, vendor, and
version attributes of the software product’s CPE are compared with the product,
vendor, and version of each entry of the CVE vulnerable software list. Note that
13
Figure 4: CPE matching overview
to compare those attributes the URIs of the CVE must be first unbound to the
WFN format (see Subsection 4.1).
Algorithm 1 summarizes the process of finding CVEs for a software product
in the CVE feeds. The algorithm receives as input the software’s CPE and the
CVE feeds. It compares the CPEs of each CVE with the software’s CPE. To per-
form the comparison two functions are defined: similar() and same version().
The function similar() compares two strings (e.g., similar(microsoft,microsof))
using the Levenshtein distance algorithm [6] and returns true if and only if the
distance is less than three. This allows dealing with possible typographical er-
rors in either the entries of the CPE dictionary or in the entries of the CVE
feeds. The function same version() compares the version of a software product
with the version of a CVE-CPE. The function uses the asterisk symbol to map
a version to a group of versions. For example, the version 1.2.∗ is equal to the
versions 1.2.3, 1.2.3.5256 or any version which starts with 1.2.
14
Input: cve feeds, software
Output: cve candidates
sw product = software.cpe.wfn.product
sw vendor = software.cpe.wfn.vendor
sw version = software.cpe.wfn.version
for cve ∈ cve feeds do
for cve cpe ∈ cve.cpe entries do
if similar(sw product, cve cpe.wfn.product) AND
similar(sw vendor, cve cpe.wfn.vendor) AND
same version(sw version, cve cpe.wfn.version) then
cve candidates.add(cve)
end
end
end
Algorithm 1: Search CVE candidates for a software product by CVE-CPE
entries
Step 2: Search by CVE Summary. As pointed out in Section 3, there
are CVE entries which do not have CPE entries. To tackle this problem, the
summaries of the CVEs (see Figure 2) are used to find CVE candidates for
a software product. The algorithm compares, using the Levenshtein distance
algorithm [6], all the words of a CVE summary with the product and vendor
attributes of the software’s CPE WFN. Algorithm 2 implements this step.
Step 3: Merge CVE Candidates. In this step, the CVE candidates deliv-
ered by the steps “Search by CVE-CPE entries” and “Search by CVE Summary”
are merged. The merged list is the final result of this phase.
15
Input: cves without cpe entries, software
Output: cve candidates
sw product = software.cpe.wfn.product
sw vendor = software.cpe.wfn.vendor
for cve ∈ cves without cpe entries do
for word ∈ cve.summary do
if similar(word, sw product) AND similar(word, sw vendor)
then
cve candidates.add(cve)
end
end
end
Algorithm 2: Search CVE candidates for a software product by CVE sum-
mary
5. Evaluation
As part of this work, we implemented an open-source VMS software called
Inventory Vulnerability Analysis (IVA)13, which core is the method described in
Section 4. In this section, we evaluate IVA and show its results when performing
fully automated analysis. First, the environment on which IVA was evaluated
is described.
5.1. Environment
To evaluate the proposed method and IVA, we set up an environment (see
Figure 5) that is composed of two Windows 7 virtual machines. On one ma-
chine, we installed known vulnerable versions of twelve software products, and
on the other machine, the latest versions (at the moment of carrying out the
evaluation) of the same products were installed. The list of software products
(see Table 1) was generated based on the top 50 products by total number of
13https://github.com/fkie-cad/iva
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Figure 5: Evaluation environment. On the Windows 7 machine on the left side, vulnerable
software versions were installed, and on the machine on the right side, the latest versions were
installed. GLPI and IVA were set up on an Ubuntu 14.04.4 LTS Server.
distinct vulnerabilities14 (the list was accessed on March 24rd 2017). From the
50 products, only those compatible with Windows 7 was considered. To collect
the information of the software installed on the Windows 7 machines, Fusion-
Inventory Agent15 was employed. This tool gathers information from different
sources (e.g., the registry) and sends it to an inventory database (in this case,
GLPI) in XML format. The software information is then read by IVA from the
GLPI database.
5.2. Fully Automated Vulnerability Analysis
In this context, fully automated vulnerability analysis refers to the capa-
bility of a system to assign a CPE identifier to a software product and then
scan for related vulnerabilities without human interaction. In this section, we
14http://www.cvedetails.com/top-50-products.php
15http://fusioninventory.org
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Vendor Product Vulnerable Latest
P1 Mozilla Firefox 48.0.2 52.0
P2 Adobe Flash Player 23.0.0.207 25.0.0.127
P3 Microsoft Internet Explorer 8.0.7601.17514 11.0.9600.17843
P4 Mozilla Thunderbird 38.6.0 45.8.0
P5 Mozilla SeaMonkey 2.35 2.46
P6 Adobe Adobe Reader 11.0.17 15.023.20070
P7 Oracle Java 8.0.1120.15 8.0.1210.13
P8 Oracle Java SE Development Kit 8.0.1120.15 8.0.1210.13
P9 Wireshark Wireshark 2.0.0 2.2.5
P10 Apple Inc. iTunes 12.1.3.6 12.5.5.5
P11 Oracle MySQL Server 5.7.15 5.7.17
P12 Adobe Adobe AIR 20.0.0.260 25.0.0.134
Table 1: List of software products used for the evaluation of IVA. The fourth column shows
the vulnerable versions of the products, and the fifth column shows the latest versions (as of
March 24th 2017).
Vendor Product Version
Adobe Systems Adobe Flash Player 23.0.0.207
Incorporated 23 NPAPI
Microsoft Corporation Internet Explorer 8.0.7601.17514
Oracle Corporation Java SE Development 8.0.1120.15
Kit 8 Update 112
The Wireshark Wireshark 2.0.0 (32-bit) 2.0.0
developer community,
https://www.wireshark.org
Table 2: Examples of the software information collected by FusionInventory Agent from the
Windows 7 machines
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analyze the results of IVA when assuming that a user assigns the first (best)
CPE candidate to a software product. Since IVA was not designed to do this
assignment automatically, we simulate this behaviour. Moreover, we do not
only analyze the accuracy of IVA to assign a CPE for a software product, but
also its capability to find CVEs related to the assigned CPE.
Table 3 and Table 4 show the results for the vulnerable and latest versions
of the software products installed on the Windows 7 machines. The first column
shows the product label according to Table 1 (e.g., P1 is the label for Mozilla
Firefox). The second column represents the best CPE candidate found by IVA
for a given product. In this case, this is the CPE that would be automatically
assigned to the product. The third column indicates whether the CPE com-
pletely matches the product information collected by FusionInventory Agent.
Note that the collected information differs from the one shown in Table 1. Ta-
ble 2 shows examples of the actual information collected by FusionInventory
Agent. The fourth column shows the number of CVEs that IVA found related
to an assigned CPE. The fifth column shows the number of positives, i.e., CVEs
that have CPE entries exactly matching the assigned CPE. The last column
represents the number of false positives, CVEs with CPE entries not exactly
matching the assigned CPE. For example, if a CVE has CPE entries where only
the main version matches the version of the assigned CPE (e.g., 2.35 6= 2.32),
then the CVE is considered as a false positive.
5.2.1. CPE Matching
As can be seen in Table 3, IVA would be able to automatically assign the
correct CPEs to ten products; however, to the products P6 and P11 incorrect
CPEs would be assigned. In the former case, the target software (android) is
incorrect, and in the latter case, the product (jserver) is incorrect. As depicted
in Figure 6, the correct CPE (cpe:/a:oracle:mysql:5.7.15) for P11 is suggested by
IVA in the third position of the candidates list. Likewise, for the latest versions
of the software products, ten out of twelve products were assigned correctly. For
P6, the software edition (classic) is not the correct one. In this case, the edition
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CPE Matching CVE Matching
Assigned CPE Correct? CVEs Correct Incorrect
P1 cpe:/a:mozilla:firefox:48.0.2 Yes 19 18 1
P2 cpe:/a:adobe:flash player:23.0.0.207 Yes 39 17 22
P3 cpe:/a:microsoft:internet explorer: Yes 349 340 9
8.0.7601.17514
P4 cpe:/a:mozilla:thunderbird:38.6.0 Yes 27 9 18
P5 cpe:/a:mozilla:seamonkey:2.35 Yes 475 1 474
P6 cpe:/a:adobe:adobe reader:11.0.17 No 237 75 162
::∼∼∼android∼∼
P7 cpe:/a:oracle:jre:8.0.1120.15 Yes 0 0 0
P8 cpe:/a:oracle:jdk:8.0.1120.15 Yes 0 0 0
P9 cpe:/a:wireshark:wireshark:2.0.0 Yes 85 84 1
P10 cpe:/a:apple:itunes:12.1.3.6 1 Yes 146 3 143
P11 cpe:/a:oracle:jserver:5.7.15 No - - -
P12 cpe:/a:adobe:adobe air:20.0.0.260 Yes 64 23 41
Table 3: Evaluation results for vulnerable versions of twelve software products installed on
Windows 7
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CPE Matching CVE Matching
Assigned CPE Correct? CVEs Correct False
P1 cpe:/a:mozilla:firefox:52.0 Yes 0 0 0
P2 cpe:/a:adobe:flash player:25.0.0.127 Yes 0 0 0
P3 cpe:/a:microsoft:internet explorer: Yes 525 523 2
11.0.9600.17843:-
P4 cpe:/a:mozilla:thunderbird:45.8.0 Yes 0 0 0
P5 cpe:/a:mozilla:seamonkey:2.46 Yes 475 0 475
P6 cpe:/a:adobe:acrobat reader dc: No 259 0 259
15.023.20070::∼∼classic∼∼∼
P7 cpe:/a:oracle:jre:8.0.1210.13 Yes 0 0 0
P8 cpe:/a:oracle:jdk:8.0.1210.13 Yes 0 0 0
P9 cpe:/a:wireshark:wireshark:2.2.5 Yes 85 0 85
P10 cpe:/a:apple:itunes:12.5.5.5 Yes 146 0 146
P11 cpe:/a:oracle:jserver:5.7.17 No - - -
P12 cpe:/a:adobe:adobe air:25.0.0.134 Yes 0 0 0
Table 4: Evaluation results for the latest versions of twelve products installed on Windows 7
21
  
 
Correct CPE 
Figure 6: IVA screenshot: Top ten CPE candidates for Oracle MySQL Server 5.7.15. The
correct CPE is in the third position
should be “Continuous”.
The results show that the method described in Section 4 fails to assign
correct CPEs to some software products if the assignment is performed auto-
matically. One problem is that the CPE dictionary does not contain CPEs for
all products, as analyzed in Section 3. Furthermore, it is a challenging task
to find the correct CPEs using the software information collected from a com-
puter. In some cases the information of a software product significantly differs
from its CPE. For example, in the case of Wireshark, the system must match
the string “Wireshark” with the string “The Wireshark developer community,
https://www.wireshark.org”. For Java, the system must match the string “jdk”
with the string “Java SE Development Kit 8 Update 112”.
5.2.2. CVE Matching
In this section, we evaluate the ability of IVA to find CVEs related to a
software product using its automatically assigned CPE. We call a CVE correct
if the software is actually affected by it, and incorrect otherwise.
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For a vulnerable version of a software product, IVA should find at least one
correct CVE. Nevertheless, as shown in Table 3, this is not the case for all prod-
ucts. Due to inconsistencies between the version collected by FusionInventory
Agent, the version schemes defined by the product’s vendor, and the version
used in the CPE dictionary and CVE feeds, no CVE was found for the Java
products (P7 and P8). As of version 5, a new versioning system was introduced
for Java products16. For example, 5 refers to the product version and 1.5 is
the developer version. However in the information gathered by the inventory
agent from the Windows machine neither the product version nor the developer
version is used. For instance, for Java 8 update 112, the version 8.0.1120.15 was
provided. The first candidate suggested by IVA keeps the version collected by
the inventory agent, but in the CVE feeds all the CPEs for Java products use
the developer version (e.g., 1.8.0). Therefore, no CVEs are found for JDK and
JRE when employing the version collected by the agent.
We can also observe in Table 3 that some products (e.g., P5) have a high
number of incorrect CVEs. This is the case especially when the main version
of different product releases are the same (e.g. 2.35 and 2.56), since IVA only
considers the main version to suggest CVEs. Nevertheless, IVA prioritizes CVE
CPEs with equal version as the version of the software product. Figure 7 shows
the CVE matches found by IVA for Mozilla SeaMonkey 2.35. As one can see, the
first CVE match has a CPE with the same version as the software product. Also
note that only the CPEs that are related to the software product are shown.
When CVE matches for a software product are found, IVA does not au-
tomatically generate alerts. The user must confirm that a CVE is indeed a
vulnerability for the software product. To facilitate this task, IVA can group
CVEs with equal CPEs. Thus, the user can confirm or discard several CVEs
at the same time. Figure 8 shows an example of grouped CVEs for Mozilla
SeaMonkey 2.35. In this case, the user can discard all CVEs since they do not
have any CPE that matches the version (2.35) of the product.
16https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Java_version_history#Versioning_change
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Figure 7: IVA screenshot: Top ten CVE matches for Mozilla SeaMonkey 2.35
To the products P6 and P11 incorrect CPEs were assigned. Nonetheless,
since IVA compares only the vendor, product, and version, for P6 75 correct
CVEs were found. This is not the case for P11, since “jserver” does not corre-
spond to the correct product name “mysql”.
For the latest versions of the software products (see Table 4) we analyze the
following cases. For the products P1, P2, P4, and P5, no CVE was found, which
is the result that is expected for the latest versions of software products. For
P5, P6, P9, P10 CVEs were found, but none of them are correct. As explained
before, when determining whether two CPEs are equal or not, apart from the
vendor and product name, IVA only considers the main version (e.g., 2.35 =
2.45). The results for the Java products (P7 and P8) seem to be correct; how-
ever, as explained before, IVA employed the version collected by the inventory
agent (e.g., 8.0.1120.15), which format does not correspond to the one used in
the CVE feeds for Java products (1.8.0).
Even though the latest version of Internet Explorer (version 11) was in-
stalled, 523 CVEs were found for P3. In these CVEs, only the main version of
24
  
Figure 8: IVA screenshot: Grouped CVE matches for Mozilla SeaMonkey 2.35
Internet Explorer 11 (e.g., cpe:/a:microsoft:internet explorer:11) is mentioned.
The CVEs description indicates however which security updates must be in-
stalled to patch the vulnerabilities. Therefore, in this case, IVA just provides a
hint to the user that the software product can be vulnerable. The user needs to
verify whether the required security updates have been installed.
6. Related Work
Takahashi et al. describe a system and architecture to monitor software
vulnerabilities in a company’s network [7]. Similar to the method explained in
this paper, the CPE dictionary is employed to look up CPE identifiers to be
assigned to software products based on the information collected by agents and
network scanners. In addition, the CVE feeds are used to find vulnerabilities
in software products using the assigned CPEs. The proposed technique aims
at carrying out this task without human interaction. The aspects discussed in
Section 3 and Section 5 are not considered. Among others, the inconsistencies in
the official CPE dictionary and CVE feeds could lead to a poor efficacy, risking
the security of an IT infrastructure. When searching for CVEs, it is assumed
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that the correct CPE was assigned. Furthermore, the employed CPE and CVE
matching algorithms are not explained.
Torkura and Meinel propose an approach to improve vulnerability assess-
ment for IT assets deployed on cloud environments (e.g., the Elastic Computing
Cloud) [8]. They implemented a system using OpenVAS17 as a vulnerabil-
ity scanner, and NVD and Amazon Web Service (AWS) security advisories as
vulnerability information sources. Other sources of information are employed,
since, based on previous studies, the authors are aware of the inaccuracy of the
NVD datasets. However, solutions to deal with the NVD drawbacks are not
proposed. Based on this approach, a system called CAVAS is implemented, and
its ability to correctly detect cloud components (e.g., Amazon Linux) is evalu-
ated. Nonetheless, an evaluation on the capability of CAVAS to correctly find
vulnerabilities in the detected components is not provided.
Other works have already pointed out the disadvantages when using the
NVD datasets for vulnerability management. Zhang et al. presented a study
in which it is observed that the NVD is not adequate to find software vulnera-
bilities due to missing software information, different version schemas, vendors’
bad practices in vulnerability release time, and data errors [9]. By means of an
experiment, Nguyen and Massacci demonstrated that a significant number of
CVEs for Google Chrome erroneously refer to some other versions [10]. Fitzger-
ald and Foley show that inconsistencies in SCAP can cause name ambiguities
in the CPE dictionary. They explain that the CPE naming specification [4]
does not offer a mechanism to define relationships between CPEs, and thus,
ambiguities are likely to exist [11].
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the official CPE dictionary and the CVE feeds.
Four major issues were observed: CVE entries without CPE references, software
17http://www.openvas.org/index.de.html
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products without assigned CPEs, typographical errors, and a lack of synchro-
nization between both datasets. To cope with these problems, we proposed a
novel method comprised of three steps: CPE matching, CPE assignment, and
CVE matching. The method is based on string similarity algorithms (e.g., edit
distance), and moreover, instead of using the URI of a CPE, its WFN format
is employed, which allows to determine the similarity of each attribute (e.g.,
vendor, product, version) separately between two compared CPEs. We also
presented IVA (Inventory Vulnerability Analysis), a Vulnerability Management
System that implements the proposed method. IVA is available as open-source
software on GitHub18.
Our evaluation (employing IVA) showed that a fully automated assignment
of a CPE identifier to a software product is impractical and error prone. IVA
therefore proposes a prioritized list of CPE candidates and lets the user select
(and, if necessary, change) the most suitable CPE.
During the evaluation other obstacles that can hinder the process of vul-
nerability analysis were encountered: name ambiguities in the CPE dictionary,
versioning format inconsistencies, and significant differences between the infor-
mation collected by the inventory agent and the information in the CPE and
CVE repositories for a software product. The erroneous assignment of a CPE
identifier to a software product can prevent from finding CVEs related to that
product, thus increasing the risk of a successful cyberattack. Therefore, when
using the CPE dictionary and CVE feeds for vulnerability scanning, the issues
discussed in this paper should be considered. Moreover, the NIST, which is
responsible for maintaining these repositories, should define a mechanism (e.g.,
synchronization between the datasets when adding, modifying or deleting a
CPE) to overcome these issues.
18https://github.com/fkie-cad/iva
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